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Persian Gulf–Pacific Asia Linkages in the Twenty-First Century: A 
Marriage of Convenience? 
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIDSON 
Abstract 
An important new relationship is developing between the six monarchies of the Persian 
Gulf and the three most industrialized states of Pacific Asia. With little shared modern 
economic history and enormous political and socio-economic disparities, and separated 
by great geographical distances, the rapidly tightening economic interdependence 
between the two regions is a recent phenomenon that deserves considerable attention. 
This paper dissects this by examining both the hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon 
trades between the two regions before turning to their increasingly bilateral sovereign 
wealth investments and their cooperation on major construction and infrastructural 
projects. The paper will then explain the absence of military security arrangements, but 
will also demonstrate how several other measures are being taken to create stronger 
non-economic bonds. Finally, a number of future collaborations will be discussed: for 
the most part these are not only innovative, but also highly symbolic of a more 
interdependent relationship. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
An important new relationship is developing between the six monarchies of the Persian Gulf 
– Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – and 
the three most industrialized states of Pacific Asia – China, Japan and South Korea. With 
little shared modern economic history, with enormous political and socio-economic 
disparities, and separated by great geographical distances, the rapidly tightening economic 
interdependence between the two regions is a recent phenomenon that deserves considerable 
attention. What began as a simple, mid-twentieth-century marriage of convenience, based on 
hydrocarbon exports in exchange for hard currency, has now evolved into a 
multidimensional, long-term mutual commitment that will not only continue to capitalize on 
the Persian Gulf’s rich energy resources and Pacific Asia’s massive energy needs, but will 
also seek to develop strong non-hydrocarbon bilateral trade, will facilitate sizeable sovereign 
wealth investments in both directions, and will provide lucrative opportunities for 
experienced Pacific Asian construction companies, their technologies and – in  
China’s case – its vast labour force. 
Although this increasingly extensive relationship does not encompass the Persian 
Gulf’s military security arrangements – which remain exclusively with Britain, France and 
the United States – and although few attempts have been made by either side to replace or 
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balance these with new Pacific Asia alliances, there is nonetheless compelling evidence  
that the two regions have also sought to strengthen their non-economic ties. An abundance  
of state-level visits, often at a much higher level than those with Western powers, and a 
considerable number of cooperative agreements, gifts, loans and other incentives, are 
undoubtedly binding these great trade partners ever closer. Moreover, with a number  
of future collaborations, including ‘hydrocarbon safekeeping’, civilian nuclear and solar 
energy projects and the building of a twenty-first-century ‘Silk Road’, and with a growing 
realization that the Pacific Asian economies, particularly China, may recover more quickly 
from the global credit crunch than the Western economies (Guardian, 7 April 2009;  
Deutsche Presse, 24 June 2009)1 – thus signifying a global shift in economic weight  
from the West to the East – the Persian Gulf’s eastward orientation can only intensify  
(Arab News, 7 May 2009, quoting Nicholas Janardhan) and the trajectory of  
interdependence will continue to accelerate. 
Following a brief historical background of relations between the Persian Gulf and 
Pacific Asia, this paper will provide a comprehensive economic and demographic statistical 
comparison of the two regions. An examination of their contemporary hydrocarbon and non-
hydrocarbon trade links will then be made, before turning to the sizeable interlinking 
investments between the nine states involved and to the several examples of major 
construction and labour contracts in the Persian Gulf having already been awarded to Pacific 
Asian companies. Finally, the efforts to boost diplomatic and other relations will be 
considered, followed by an analysis of the many recent efforts to explore innovative future 
avenues of economic and technical cooperation. 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Persian Gulf’s oil trade with the Pacific Asian economies began in the early 1950s, when 
Japanese oil companies were scouring the globe for resources to fuel Japan’s rapid post-war 
industrialization programme. Most of the Gulf sheikhdoms were off-limits to Japan, as they 
remained part of Britain’s ‘Trucial System’ – a series of nineteenth-century peace treaties 
between London and the various sheikhs that guaranteed British protection in exchange for 
exclusive political and economic relations (Onley 2007). Saudi Arabia, however, was the key 
                                                 
1 In April 2009 the World Bank predicted that China will secure a growth rate of 6.5 per cent in 2009 and will 
help pull Pacific Asia out of its recession. In June 2009 the OECD made similar predictions for China and 
forecast that Japan would return to growth in early 2010. 
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exception, with Britain having formally recognized King Abdul-Aziz bin Saud’s 
independence in 1932 and being unable to prevent the United States’ Standard Oil of 
California from beginning exploration the following year. In 1953 Japan was able to dispatch 
freely an economic delegation to Saudi Arabia, and the following year formal diplomatic 
relations began. By 1956 Japan’s Arabian Oil Company had secured a forty-three-year 
concession to explore and extract Saudi oil,2 and in 1960 production commenced. The 
lucrative relationship was then quickly strengthened by the Saudi ruling family, with its first 
minister for defence – Prince Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud – visiting Tokyo in 1960, and 
with its third king, Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, visiting in 1971. 
In parallel, non-hydrocarbon trade between the Persian Gulf and Japan was also 
beginning to flourish, although its origins were rather more circuitous. Dubai, as one of the 
Trucial States,3 had long been exploring inventive ways of circumventing Britain’s tight 
economic controls (Davidson 2008: 19), and in the 1950s and 1960s the sheikhdom managed 
to position itself as the primary re-export hub for goods destined for India. Following the 
latter’s independence and the attempts of its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, to 
replicate the Soviet miracle by using the state to plan and protect the economy, a number of 
restrictive practices were introduced that effectively prevented India-based merchants from 
meeting domestic demand for their products, especially fabrics. In particular, sasooni cotton 
from the Nichibo mills in Japan was in great demand, along with cotton latha from the 
Nishinbo Three Peaches and Toyobo Flying Dragon mills. Dubai played the role of an 
intermediary, its merchants carefully ordering the necessary materials well in advance so as 
to overcome the lengthy five-month shipping time from Japan. Similarly profitable was 
Dubai’s trade in sourcing specialist textiles, such as Japan’s Tetron for wealthy Indians and 
Pakistanis resident in both Dubai and the then Bombay, often for use in the manufacture of 
saris and other garments (Buxani 2003: 109–10, 118; Davidson 2008: 70). By the late 1970s 
Dubai’s trade with Japan had expanded to include electrical goods, with the re-exporting of 
millions of Hitachi personal stereos to the subcontinent (Davidson 2008: 313),4 and by 1982 
                                                 
2 The concession duly ended in early 2000. 
3 Before their independence in 1971 there were nine Trucial States: Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Bahrain, Dubai, 
Fujairah, Qatar, Ra’s al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm al-Qawain. 
4 These personal stereos from Dubai were so popular with Keralites that they became known as ‘Malbaris’. 
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thousands of Japanese television sets were being distributed across India and the Persian Gulf 
(Buxani 2003: 117–19, 121; Davidson 2008: 71).5 
With Britain’s granting of independence to Kuwait in 1961, and with its withdrawal 
from the Trucial States in 1971, Japan’s opportunities for further oil concessions and more 
formal non-hydrocarbon trade expanded to include all the Persian Gulf monarchies. Formal 
diplomatic relations were established with Kuwait in 1961, and in late 1971 Japan was one  
of the first countries to recognise the newly formed federation of United Arab Emirates. The 
following year relations were also established with Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. The Arabian 
Oil Company – by this stage 80 per cent owned by Japan and 20 per cent owned by Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait – duly signed concessions in Kuwait in 1961 (CIA 2009), and the 
Japanese Oil Development Company (JODCO) took a stake in an international consortium  
to exploit UAE offshore oil in late 1972 (Abu Dhabi Marine Operating Company 2009). 
Although China was also involved in some of the re-export trade in the Persian Gulf 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the volume was much lower than that  with Japan, and most of the 
activity took place in Qatar and Kuwait rather than Dubai (China, Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 2009). With sizeable domestic hydrocarbon reserves and less momentum behind its 
industrialization programme, China’s interest in an oil trade with the Persian Gulf was also 
much lower than Japan’s. Moreover, during this period China’s open support for anti-
imperialist, revolutionary movements stymied most opportunities for closer ties with the 
Gulf’s ruling families (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 201), most of which were beneficiaries of the 
British Trucial System (Davidson 2005: 29–31).6 Nonetheless, with an eye to the future, the 
ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah, visited China in 1965, and diplomatic 
relations were established in 1971. By 1978 circumstances were already beginning to change, 
as the initiation of a series of Chinese economic and political reforms – the ‘Four 
Modernizations’ – that aimed to stimulate economic growth and support modernization 
(Evans 1995)7 effectively led to the downgrading of Marxist ideologies in China’s external 
relations (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 201). The door having been opened, Oman immediately 
established diplomatic relations, while the UAE followed suit in 1984, and the following year 
                                                 
5 In 1982 demand for television sets was very high, as many households wished to watch the Asian Games, held 
in New Delhi that year. 
6 Peace treaties signed between Gulf ruling families and the British Empire in the nineteenth century effectively 
guaranteed the former’s security from both foreign aggression and domestic insurgency. 
7 The four modernizations were in the fields of agriculture, industry, technology, and defence. The aim was to 
make China into a great economic power by the early twenty-first century.  
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Saudi Arabia held its first official meeting with China on Omani territory. Just days after  
the 1981 formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council – the loose organization that was to 
represent the joint interests of the Persian Gulf monarchies – China had granted it recognition 
(Yetiv and Lu 2007: 202). Significantly, in 1983 China began to import crude oil from Oman 
as a temporary measure, in order to alleviate the problem of transporting its own oil from its 
northern provinces to refineries on the Yangtze River. By 1988, as Chinese demand for oil 
was accelerating rapidly in tandem with its increasing population and intensifying 
industrialization, the Omani arrangement was made permanent (Ghafour 2009: 87, 89).  
By 1990 China’s presence had extended to all the Persian Gulf monarchies, embassies  
being set up in Qatar in 1988, in Bahrain in 1989 and in Saudi Arabia in 1990 (China, 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). 
Although far less proactive than Japan and China during this period, with its major oil 
companies not being established until the late 1970s8 and with most of its other trade links to 
the Persian Gulf also developing more recently, South Korea was nonetheless during the 
1960s and 1970s carefully building the foundations of its present strong relationship. For  
the most part, it established diplomatic relations in the wake of Japan but ahead of China, 
embassies being set up in Saudi Arabia in 1961, in Oman in 1974, in Qatar in 1974, in 
Bahrain in 1976, in Kuwait in 1979 and finally in the UAE in 1980 (South Korea,  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). 
3. ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON 
As their economies and populations continue to expand rapidly, accurate and timely statistics 
for the Persian Gulf monarchies and the leading Pacific Asia economies are difficult to 
compile and are soon dated. Nonetheless, a compilation of the presently available data still 
serves as a useful snapshot of the ever increasing compatibility of the two regions. Most 
noticeably, over the years since trade links and diplomatic relations were first established 
between these countries, most of the Persian Gulf monarchies have confirmed their position 
as the world’s leading hydrocarbon exporters, with a plethora of recent discoveries 
guaranteeing increased export capacity for the foreseeable future. At the same time, a period 
of careful investing has allowed some of these monarchies to build up the world’s greatest 
sovereign wealth funds, all of which require access to new markets and opportunities. 
                                                 
8 For example, S-Oil Corporation was established in 1977. 
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Table 1. Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia economic and demographic overview, 2009.  
Country GDP 
($ 
trillion) 
GDP/ 
 capita 
 Resident 
 population 
Labour 
 force 
Oil  
reserves
(bn.  
barrels) 
Oil  
consumption 
 (barrels/day) 
Gas reserves 
(trillion  
cubic m.) 
Gas  
consumption 
(bn. cubic 
metres/year) 
Japan 4.3  $34,200 127 m. 66.2 m. >0.1  5.0 m. (100% 
imported) 
>0.01  100.3 (96% 
imported) 
China 7.8  $6,000 1.34 bn. 807.7 m. 16.0  7.9 m. (58% 
imported) 
2.3  70.5 (5% 
imported) 
South 
Korea 
1.3  $26,000 45.5 m. 24.4 m. 0 2.1 m. (100% 
imported) 
0.1  37.0 (93% 
imported) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.6  $20.700 28.6 m. (20% 
expatriate) 
6.7 m. 266.8  1.0 m.  7.2  75.9  
UAE 0.2  $40,000 4.8 m. (86% 
expatriate) 
3.3 m. 97.8  0.4 m.  6.1  43.1 (3% 
imported) 
Kuwait 0.2  $57,400 2.7 m. (48% 
expatriate) 
2.2 m. 104.0  0.3 m.  1.6  12.5  
Qatar 0.1  $103,500 0.8 m. (80% 
expatriate) 
1.1 m. 15.2  0.1 m.  25.6  20.1  
Oman 0.1  $20,200 3.4 m. (17% 
expatriate) 
0.9 m. 5.5  0.1 m.  0.1  11.0  
Bahrain >0.1  $37,200 0.7 m. (32% 
expatriate) 
0.5 m. 0.1  >0.1 m. (50% 
imported) 
0.1  11.3  
Sources: CIA (2009); International Monetary Fund; World Bank; Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
 
Equally clearly, Japan remains one of the world’s largest economies, while China has caught 
up and overtaken, and South Korea’s gross domestic product now exceeds, many Western 
industrialized economies. At the same time, however, their reliance on hydrocarbon imports 
has increased drastically and, in China’s case, its labour force has mushroomed to several 
hundred million, making opportunities for overseas employment increasingly vital. As  
with the Persian Gulf monarchies, Japan’s potential to make sizeable foreign investments 
remains strong, but even more notable is the recent emergence of large state-managed funds 
in China and South Korea, some of which have already begun to eclipse their Persian Gulf 
counterparts. In the following tables and throughout the paper, the Persian Gulf monarchies 
will be listed according to their GDP, beginning with Saudi Arabia and ending with Bahrain. 
The Pacific Asian economies will also be listed according to their GDP, although for the  
most part Japan will still be placed ahead of China, given its position of economic pre-
eminence until very recently. 
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Table 2. Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia sovereign wealth funds by assets  
under management, 2009. 
World 
ranking 
Fund name Country Date of 
inception 
Source of 
wealth 
Current 
assets 
1 Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority  
UAE (Abu 
Dhabi) 
1976 Oil surpluses $627 bn 
2 SAMA Foreign 
Holdings 
Saudi Arabia 1960 Oil surpluses $431 bn 
4 SAFE Investment 
Company 
China 1997 Non-
hydrocarbon 
$347 bn 
5 China Investment 
Corporation 
China 2007 Non-
hydrocarbon 
$288 bn 
7 Kuwait Investment 
Authority 
Kuwait 1963 Oil surpluses $203 bn 
8 Hong Kong Monetary 
Policy Investment 
Portfolio 
China (Hong 
Kong) 
1998 Non-
hydrocarbon 
$193 bn 
11 National Social 
Security Fund 
China 2000 Non-
hydrocarbon 
$82 bn 
12 Investment Corporation 
of Dubai 
UAE (Dubai) 2006 Oil surpluses $82 bn 
14 Qatar Investment 
Authority 
Qatar 2006 Gas surpluses $65 bn 
20 Korea Investment 
Corporation 
South Korea 2005 Non-
hydrocarbon 
$27 bn 
25 Mubadala 
Development 
Corporation 
UAE (Abu 
Dhabi) 
2002 Non-
hydrocarbon 
$15 bn 
26 Mumtalakat Holding 
Company 
Bahrain 2006 Oil surpluses $14 bn 
27 International Petroleum 
Investment Company 
UAE (Abu 
Dhabi) 
1984 Oil surpluses $14 bn 
35 State General Reserve 
Fund 
Oman 1980 Oil and gas 
surpluses 
$8 bn 
Sources: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute; Saudi Arabia Market Information Resource and Directory. 
 
4. THE HYDROCARBON TRADE 
The hydrocarbon trade undoubtedly remains the central pillar in the relationship between  
the Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia, and could be worth as much as US$192.2 billion per year 
(table 3). At present, the former produces a combined total of about 16.6 billion barrels of 
crude oil per day, which is about 19 per cent of the global total. The bulk of production takes 
place in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait. The region also produces about 232 billion 
cubic metres of natural gas per year, which is about 8 per cent of the global total. The bulk of 
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production takes place in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But, more importantly perhaps, 
the Persian Gulf monarchies account for 37 per cent of all known crude oil reserves and  
25 per cent of all known natural gas reserves (CIA 2009: 2007 and 2008 estimates, author’s 
calculations for totals). Saudi Arabia alone accounts for 25 per cent of global oil reserves  
(BP 2008) and Qatar 15 per cent of global gas reserves (US Government 2009). 
At the other extreme, Japan’s current hydrocarbon consumption is 5 million barrels  
of oil per day, all of which it has to import, and 100.3 billion cubic metres of gas per year,  
95 per cent of which it has to import. China’s current consumption is 7.9 million barrels of  
oil per day, 58 per cent of which it has to import, and 70.5 billion cubic metres of gas per 
year, 5 per cent of which it has to import. South Korea’s current consumption is 2.1 million 
barrels of oil per day, all of which it has to import, and 37 billion cubic metres of gas per 
year, 93 per cent of which it has to import. Respectively, Japan and China have the fourth- 
and third-greatest oil consumption needs in the world, ahead of Russia, Germany and India, 
while South Korea has now also entered the top ten. Japan has the fifth-greatest gas 
consumption needs in the world, ahead of Germany and the United Kingdom, while China 
and South Korea have now moved into the top twenty (CIA 2009: 2006–8 estimates, author’s 
calculations for totals), and are likely to catch Japan in the near future. Certainly, according  
to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), although Japan’s demand 
for oil is likely to fall by 15 per cent by 2030, China, South Korea and other Pacific Asia 
economies are likely to make up 80 per cent of net oil demand growth over the same  
period (The National, 5 August 2009). 
 
Table 3. Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia: total value of  
annual hydrocarbon trade, 2008. 
 Japan China South Korea Total 
 (US$ billion) 
Saudi Arabia 33.0  15.0 21.0 69.0 
UAE 47.0  4.5 13.0 64.5 
Kuwait 15.0  0.7 8.1 23.8 
Qatar 17.0 1.0 7.0 25.0 
Oman 2.6  1.5 5.1 9.2 
Bahrain 0.4       – 0.3 0.7 
Total 115.0  22.7 54.5 192.2 
 Sources: CIA 2009; BP 2008. 
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Specifically, Japan currently imports about 1.3 million barrels of oil per day from 
Saudi Arabia, which is over 31 per cent of its total oil imports and worth close to $33 billion 
per year for Saudi Arabia (Japan, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). This now makes Saudi 
Arabia Japan’s fifth largest trading partner, and Japan Saudi Arabia’s second-largest trading  
partner (Saudi Gazette, 22 July 2009). In close second place, the UAE now exports 800,000 
barrels of oil per day to Japan (The National, 26 June 2009), with total oil and gas exports 
from Abu Dhabi – the most resource-rich of the UAE’s seven constituent emirates – now 
worth over $47 billion (Japan, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). Significantly, over 60  
per cent of Abu Dhabi’s oil exports are now destined for Japan (UAE, Ministry for Finance 
and Industry 2009), and in early 2009 the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) 
strengthened the connection further by granting a twenty-year extension to an existing 
offshore concession managed by a consortium led by Japan’s Cosmo Oil Company (The 
National, 26 June 2009). Similarly, Abu Dhabi’s primary gas customer for many years has 
been Japan, and in particular the Tokyo Electricity Power Company (TEPCO), which 
purchases over 4 million tons of liquid natural gas annually from Abu Dhabi Gas 
Liquefaction (ADGAS), a subsidiary of ADNOC (The National, 28 July 2009). In 1997 
TEPCO even paid ADGAS a one-off fee of $400 million, as Japan sought to stabilize Abu 
Dhabi’s gas revenues during a period of depressed gas prices in the late 1990s (Ministry for 
Finance and Industry (UAE) 2009). Japan’s hydrocarbon trade with the other Persian Gulf 
monarchies is much less, but still noteworthy, its annual imports from Qatar – most of which 
is gas – totalling $17 billion, its imports from Kuwait – most of which is oil – totalling $15 
billion, and its imports from Oman and Bahrain being $2.6 billion and $0.4 billion 
respectively (Japan, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). 
China’s total hydrocarbon trade with the Persian Gulf monarchies is substantially less 
than Japan’s, mainly due to its domestic gas reserves; nonetheless its oil imports have been 
rising sharply, with $1.5 of imports in 1991, $20 billion in 2004, and nearly $33.8 billion in 
2005 (Ghafour 2009: 83–4). Unsurprisingly, during the latter part of this period, China’s 
Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–5) contained its government’s first public acknowledgement that 
overseas oil supplies needed to be secured if China were to enjoy continued economic growth 
and modernization (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 199). In the next few years China’s imports are likely 
to double again, with one Chinese official recently stating that ‘we need to find oil fast’ 
(International Herald Tribune, 2 October 2006) and another commentator explaining that  
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‘if China’s demand for oil imports was limited to just two or three million barrels per day, 
most of this could be sourced from Russia or nearby Central Asian republics, but with the 
huge oil and gas imports predicted for the next decade and beyond, China is compelled to 
turn to the Persian Gulf’ (Ghafour 2009: 82–3). Certainly, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) predicts that China’s imports will grow to over 11 million barrels per day by 2030, 
more than half of which will have to be sourced from the Persian Gulf (Ghafour 2009: 82). 
As with Japan, Saudi Arabia is currently China’s greatest supplier of oil, with about 
500,000 barrels of oil per day – or 30 per cent of China’s total oil imports (Ghafour 2009:  
83) – being shipped by Aramco to the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec). 
This compares with 17.5 per cent of China’s total oil imports in 2005 and just 1.2 per cent in 
1994 (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 203). Innovatively, since 2001 some 30,000 of the imported Saudi 
barrels have been in part exchange for Aramco being allowed to operate 600 petrol stations  
in China’s Fujian province (Ghafour 2009: 87–8). In 2006, following the signing of five  
new energy cooperation agreements (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 205), the total Sino-Saudi  
oil trade reached $15 billion and had witnessed 40 per cent growth year-on-year since  
1999. By 2010 Saudi imports will increase to 1 million barrels per day in what has been 
described by Aramco as ‘one of the most important energy relationships in the world’ 
(Ghafour 2009: 87–8). This could represent as much as 70 per cent of China’s total oil 
imports (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 203).  
In second place with its hydrocarbon exports has again been the UAE’s Abu Dhabi, 
with annual oil exports to China having risen from $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion over the past 
five years. Oman, courtesy of its aforementioned twenty-five-year history of oil exports to 
China, still remains a significant supplier, its oil trade with Sinopec having risen from $1.5 
billion in 2002 to $4.4 billion in recent years. Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain’s hydrocarbon trade 
with China has been more modest, but again the trajectory is impressive, Kuwait’s supply of 
200,000 barrels per day – currently worth $700 million – being likely to double in the next 
few years, and Qatar’s gas exports to China having risen in value from under $100 million in 
1999 to nearly $1 billion today (China, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). 
For South Korea the import pattern is much the same as with its larger neighbours, 
although, much like Japan, it requires from the Persian Gulf substantial imports of both oil 
and gas, given its lack of domestic gas reserves. Saudi Arabia is its largest trade partner, 
supplying about 770,000 barrels of oil per day as part of an annual hydrocarbon trade worth 
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$21 billion. The UAE is the second-largest trade partner, supplying about 430,000 barrels of 
oil per day as part of an annual hydrocarbon trade worth $13 billion (South Korea, Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs 2009). This makes South Korea the second-largest importer of Abu 
Dhabi’s oil after Japan (The National, 5 August 2009). Kuwait’s total oil and gas exports  
to South Korea are also sizeable – worth $8.1 billion, while Qatar’s are worth $7 billion – 
almost exclusively gas exports – Oman’s are worth $5.1 billion and Bahrain’s $0.3 billion 
(South Korea, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). 
5. THE NON-HYDROCARBON TRADE 
Non-hydrocarbon trade between the Persian Gulf monarchies and Pacific Asia is on a much 
smaller scale than oil and gas. Nonetheless, as demonstrated, there has been an historical 
precedent for the importing of certain goods from Pacific Asia into the Persian Gulf, 
especially textiles and electrical goods, and as the latter region’s per capita wealth accelerated 
during the oil era, the demand for such imports has continued to increase, along with new 
demands for cars, machinery, building materials and many other products associated with  
the region’s oil and construction booms. In total, such imports from Japan, China and South 
Korea could be worth as much as $32 billion per year.9 Importantly, there is no longer a 
complete imbalance of non-hydrocarbon trade between the two regions, as some of the 
export-oriented industries that have been established in the Persian Gulf – mostly in an 
attempt to diversify oil-dependent economies10 – are now among the world’s leading 
producers of metals and plastics. Their export capacity continues to increase, with most  
of their future surpluses being earmarked for their Pacific Asia customers. 
Japan’s greatest non-hydrocarbon trade partner in the Persian Gulf is the UAE,  
as a function of historic ties to Dubai’s entrepôt trade, Abu Dhabi’s commitment to building 
up heavy, non-hydrocarbon-related industries (Davidson 2008: 70–1; 2009: 72–3), and the 
UAE’s high per capita wealth which is now in excess of $40,000 (CIA 2009: 2008 estimate). 
Their total non-hydrocarbon trade is now over $11 billion per year (Japan, Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs 2009). Japan’s second-largest non-hydrocarbon trade partner in the region  
is Saudi Arabia, the two countries having begun to sign economic and technical cooperation 
agreements as early as 1975. Presently, their non-hydrocarbon trade has mushroomed to over 
                                                 
9 Author’s calculations based on subsequently listed country totals. 
10 E.g. for Dubai’s diversification see Davidson 2008: 99–135; for Abu Dhabi’s diversification see Davidson 
2009: 69–94. 
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$5 billion, most of which is made up of Saudi imports of Japanese cars, machinery and 
consumer durables, but consisting also of Japanese imports of Saudi metals (Japan, Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs 2009). Among some of the more innovative recent linkages has been  
the exporting of Japanese water-related technologies to Saudi Arabia, following the 
establishment in 2005 by the Japan Cooperation Centre for the Middle East (JCCME) of a 
Jeddah Water Desk in the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI). Since then 
1,500 Saudi trainees have undertaken professional development courses in Japan relating to 
water treatment, sewerage and irrigation. In 2009 the JCCI further strengthened its links with 
Japan by setting up a more broadly defined memorandum of understanding on ‘finding new 
means of enhancing economic and trade relations’ with the Japanese External Trade 
Organization (JETRO) (Saudi Gazette, 22 July 2009). 
Japan’s non-hydrocarbon trade with Kuwait, Qatar and Oman is presently about  
$2 billion, $1.8 billion and $1.7 billion respectively, most of which, again, is made up of 
Japanese exports of cars, machinery and consumer durables. Although Bahrain remains 
Japan’s least significant trading partner in the Persian Gulf, it is noteworthy that their non-
hydrocarbon trade has increased dramatically, from $700 million in 2007 (Japan, Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs 2009) to nearly $1.3 billion today, and is expected to increase by a further  
20 per cent over the following year. With few hydrocarbon exports, Bahrain has been actively 
seeking new markets for its export-oriented industries; it has been successful in selling 
aluminium to Japan, which is now Bahrain’s second greatest trading partner, after the  
United States. In summer 2009 the relationship intensified when delegations from Aluminium 
Bahrain (ALBA) began touring Japan in an effort to consolidate business with existing 
Japanese customers while also searching for new opportunities. In parallel, a Joint Economic 
Committee was set up between the Bahraini Ministry for Finance and Industry and the Japan 
Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), building on the prior establishment of a Bahrain–
Japan Friendship Society in early 2009 (Gulf Daily News, 24 and 29 July 2009). Overall, 
Japanese non-hydrocarbon trade with the Persian Gulf is set to increase even further as 
negotiations over a free trade agreement (FTA)11 between Japan and the six monarchies  
are currently taking place, having commenced in 2006. 
                                                 
11 A free trade agreement being a measure to link a free trade area of two or more countries that have agreed to 
eliminate tariffs, quotas and preferences on most (if not all) goods and services traded between them. 
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China’s greatest non-hydrocarbon trade partner in the Persian Gulf has for many years 
been Saudi Arabia, a memorandum of understanding on bilateral trade having been signed  
in 1988 – as described, two years before China had even granted diplomatic recognition  
to Saudi Arabia. In 1992 a bilateral trade conference was staged and in 1996, under the 
auspices of a GCC–China consultative mechanism, annual trade meetings began between  
the two countries, held alternately in Riyadh and Beijing (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 202). Today,  
it is estimated that their total annual non-hydrocarbon trade is worth $1.7 billion, mostly 
made up of Saudi imports of Chinese textiles and machinery (China, Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs 2009), making Saudi Arabia China’s tenth-largest international export destination 
(Ghafour 2009: 87). 
The UAE is presently China’s second-largest non-hydrocarbon trade partner in the 
Persian Gulf, total trade being estimated at $500 million, again primarily made up of imports 
of Chinese textiles and machinery (China, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009). In 1985 China 
and the UAE signed an agreement on trade and technological cooperation and followed this 
up by establishing a Joint Commission of Economic, Trade and Technical Cooperation, 
which has since convened four meetings. In the near future it is likely that China’s trade with 
the UAE will increase massively, and perhaps will soon overtake Japan’s non-hydrocarbon 
trade with that state. Most of this growth is expected to be as a result of Dubai’s 
strengthening relationship with China, Dubai Ports World stating in 2008 that China  
was already Dubai’s second-largest trade partner, after Iran, Chinese non-hydrocarbon  
trade having increased by nearly 50 per cent since 2005 (Arabian Business, 31 March 2008). 
Central to this development has been Dubai Aluminium (DUBAL), the most successful of the 
Dubai government-backed parastatals since the onset of the global recession, its sales rising 
by about 5 per cent since 2008, mostly attributed to its Chinese exports (Gulf Daily News,  
3 August 2009). Launched in 2007, the Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC) – 
essentially a precious metals re-exporting operation that builds on Dubai’s historical  
expertise in gold trading and its impressive port facilities (Davidson 2008: 45, 69–70) –  
has also been enjoying a strong trade with China. Even though demand for gold in the  
Middle East and South Asia has fallen by 30 per cent since 2008, Chinese demand has risen 
by 8 per cent over the same period, making it the world’s second-largest consumer of gold  
(The National, 27 July 2009). 
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China’s non-hydrocarbon trade with the other Persian Gulf monarchies is also 
growing, annual trade with Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar being worth $260 million,  
$60 million, $60 million and $50 million respectively. These relationships have been 
facilitated by several agreements similar to those made by China with Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE, including an agreement on economic and technical cooperation between China and 
Kuwait in 1989, the setting up of a China–Oman bilateral trade commission in 1989, which 
has since held five meetings, the signing of a China–Bahrain agreement on trade cooperation 
in 1990, and the establishment of a China–Qatar bilateral trade commission in 2000. 
As with Japan, China intends to increase its non-hydrocarbon trade with the Persian 
Gulf even further by achieving an FTA with all six of the monarchies in the near future. 
These FTA negotiations began in 2004 following a visit by a GCC delegation to China (Yetiv 
and Lu 2007: 206), while simultaneously a China-Arab Cooperation Forum was set up 
between the Chinese Ministry for Commerce and the Arab League. At meetings of this forum 
the Chinese Ministry for Commerce predicted that total trade with the Persian Gulf would 
reach $100 billion by 2010, not all of which would be hydrocarbon trade. Subsequent FTA 
negotiations were held in 2005 and 2006, by which stage agreements had been reached on 
tariff reductions. Although the talks have since stalled due to China’s unwillingness to lift 
certain import restrictions on a number of non-hydrocarbon goods from the Persian Gulf, in 
early 2009 the concept of an FTA was reinvigorated by the president of China, who stated 
that ‘The Gulf FTA is in the fundamental and long-term interests of both sides and will help 
deepen their mutually beneficial cooperation and achieve common development.’ He also 
pledged that ‘China will work actively towards signing the FTA at the earliest date.’ In 
summer 2009 the GCC reciprocated China’s sentiments by publishing a White Paper entitled 
‘Economic relations between GCC member states and the People’s Republic of China’, 
which similarly urged the swift conclusion of FTA negotiations (China Daily, 30 January 
2004; People’s Daily, 12 February 2009; Gulf Cooperation Council Secretariat 2009). 
Significantly, if the FTA is completed soon this will make the GCC the first organization 
 – ahead of even the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) – to conclude  
an FTA with China. 
South Korea’s non-hydrocarbon trade with the Persian Gulf is more modest, although 
as with Japan and China its relationship is strengthening, the Persian Gulf monarchies having 
collectively become South Korea’s second-largest export destination after China (Zawya Dow 
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Jones, 8 March 2009), most of the trade being made up of cars, rubber parts and textiles. 
Individually, South Korea’s non-hydrocarbon trade with Saudi Arabia is about $3 billion, the 
UAE $2.9 billion, Qatar $800 million, Kuwait $700 million, Oman $300 million and Bahrain 
$100 million. South Korea has not yet advanced as far as Japan and China with a Persian 
Gulf FTA; however negotiations did begin in summer 2008, a second round being held in 
spring 2009. Thus far, tariff-related incentives have been discussed, and the South Korean 
minister for commerce has predicted that the FTA could be finalized by the end of 2009 
(Kuwait Times, 8 March 2009). 
6. INVESTMENTS AND JOINT VENTURES 
Alongside the booming hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon trades, the relationship between 
the Persian Gulf monarchies and Pacific Asia is been greatly enhanced by a substantial flow 
of investments between the two regions. Significantly, these investments are being made in 
both directions and at all levels, and they include massive sovereign wealth investments. 
Although the majority are still connected to the oil and gas sectors, there is strong evidence 
that an increasingly diverse range of non-hydrocarbon joint ventures is also being established. 
In the short term these opportunities are providing the Persian Gulf monarchies with a 
realistic alternative to the mature Western economies for their overseas investments. Such  
an alternative was viewed as being particularly necessary following the 11 September 2001 
attacks on New York’s World Trade Center, after which many Western governments and 
companies did little to disguise their distrust of Gulf sovereign wealth funds, many arguing 
that the funds were not merely commercial and that power politics could be involved (Arab 
News, 7 May 2009, quoting Nicholas Janardhan). In the long term these new opportunities 
will allow an even tighter economic interdependence between the greatest hydrocarbon 
customers and their suppliers (Ghafour 2009: 83). 
Japan is presently the largest foreign investor in Saudi Arabia, over $11 billion of 
active investments being distributed among twenty-four different projects, including sixteen 
industrial projects and eight service-sector projects (Saudi Gazette, 22 July 2009). In the 
other direction, Saudi Arabia’s Aramco now holds a 15 per cent stake in Japan’s fifth-largest 
oil company, Showa Shell Sekiyu. And in summer 2009 the two countries entered into a $1 
billion joint venture, when the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and Japan’s 
Mitsubishi Rayon agreed to build an acrylics factory in Saudi Arabia, Mitsubishi holding  
the majority stake. In the UAE, Abu Dhabi’s third-largest sovereign wealth fund, the 
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International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC), has recently sought a $5 billion 
package from Japan’s Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group and the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corporation. This in turn will allow these Japanese banks to have an interest in some of 
IPIC’s overseas investments, including its purchase of Canada’s Nova Chemicals 
Corporation and its stake in Spain’s Compañía Española de Petróleos (CEPSA) (Associated 
Press, 2 August 2009). In the other direction IPIC has now taken a 20 per cent stake in 
Japan’s Cosmo Oil Company, which, as described, continues to hold a major Abu Dhabi 
offshore oil concession, thus strengthening further Japan–UAE interdependence. Other 
notable Japanese interests in the Persian Gulf currently include over $5 billion of investments 
in five hydrocarbon and infrastructural projects in Qatar, and a total of $260 million of 
investments in five infrastructural projects in Oman. 
In early 2005 the Chinese Ministry for Commerce revealed that Chinese investments 
in the Persian Gulf monarchies had already reached $5 billion, while Persian Gulf 
investments in China totalled $700 million (Ghafour 2009: 87). With a flurry of further 
investments and joint ventures since that announcement, these figures have since 
mushroomed, and will soon overtake even Japan’s interests in the region. In particular, China 
has sought investments to help build up its oil-refining industries, in which the Persian Gulf 
economies have sought to have a dominant presence (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 205). At present 
China’s greatest investment partner from the Persian Gulf is Kuwait, in a relationship which 
strengthened greatly following the setting up of a $9 billion joint venture between the Kuwait 
Petroleum Corporation and Sinopec in 2005. The two companies will build a 300,000 barrels 
per day oil refinery and ethylene plant in China’s southern Guangdong province. Although 
the exact location of the facilities has since been changed, due to environmental concerns 
raised by nearby Hong Kong,12 the project is still expected to come into operation in 2013 
and will be China’s largest-ever joint project (Associated Press, 26 June 2009). In 2006 this 
deal was followed up by the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) buying over $700 million in 
shares in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, thereby making Kuwait one of the 
biggest investors in one of China’s first major public offerings. In the other direction, China 
may soon become heavily involved in Kuwaiti projects, Sinopec currently having a sizeable 
stake in an international consortium that is bidding for an $8 billion infrastructural 
                                                 
12 The facilities were originally going to be built at Nansha City, but in 2009 the location was changed to 
Zhanjiang City. 
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programme (Ghafour 2009: 89). But the most innovative aspect of the investments between 
the two countries has been the establishment of the Kuwait–China Investment Company 
(KCIC) in 2005. Set up by the Kuwait government, the KCIC is 15 per cent owned by KIA 
and has a capital base of about $350 million, about half of which is held in cash. It has 
specialized in investments in Chinese agribusinesses, particularly those producing crops with 
a high export value, such as rice, wheat, corn and sorghum. Significantly, KCIC’s 
investments in China have been defended as being purely commercial and not primarily 
connected with Kuwaiti or Persian Gulf food security – unlike the recent deals between the 
Persian Gulf monarchies and Pakistan, which clearly are.13 In 2009 the managing director of 
KCIC stated simply that ‘we think it is an opportune sector that will help Pacific Asia 
effectively become the bread basket of the world … we think food security, in the long term, 
is better served by collaborative investment in Asia as opposed to securing crops exclusively 
for one country’. He also stated of KCIC’s existing collaborations with Chinese 
agribusinesses that ‘our financial skills are paired with agri-sector skills and hopefully  
both of these skills can help mitigate some of the risks and provide a decent return for  
the investors’ (Financial Times, 10 July 2009). 
As well as Kuwait, China is also heavily involved with Saudi Arabia, Aramco having 
taken a 25 per cent stake in a major joint venture with Sinopec in 2001. Close to completion, 
this has involved the two companies expanding an existing refinery in China’s Fujian 
Province along with building a new ethylene plant. In the near future another joint venture 
between the two companies may take place, but this time with Aramco taking the majority 
stake. This could lead to the building of the largest oil refinery in China, and may require as 
much as $6 billion to complete. Similarly, SABIC has already helped to initiate three 
petrochemicals projects in China as part of its ‘China Plan’, which aims to facilitate mutual 
investments between the two countries, support China’s economic development and satisfy 
its increasing demand as one of its premier suppliers (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 207–8). In the other 
direction Sinopec has recently embarked on yet another joint venture with Aramco, taking an 
80 per cent, $300 million stake in a new oil and gas exploration company in Saudi Arabia 
(Ghafour 2009: 87–8). Elsewhere in the Persian Gulf, Qatar has recently followed Kuwait’s 
lead and has signalled its intent to purchase $200 million in shares in the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (Ghafour 2009: 87). And in summer 2009 it was announced that 
                                                 
13 See, for example, the recent agreements between the UAE and Pakistan (Gulf News, 7 October 2009). 
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Qatar Petroleum would enter into a joint venture with PetroChina worth $12 billion. This 
would lead to the construction of a new petrochemicals plant in China’s Zhejiang province, 
an oil refinery, an ethylene plant and a port for oil tankers.  
The UAE, and more specifically Dubai, is also investing in China, with its 
government-owned Dubai Ports World parastatal now operating seven terminals in China, 
three of them in Hong Kong. In the near future it will also open a terminal in China’s 
Qingdao province. It now also operates a terminal in South Korea and, in other parts of east 
Asia, it has opened terminals in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. In 2009 Dubai Ports 
World announced that it would take an 80 per cent stake in a joint venture with Vietnam’s 
state-owned Tan Thuan Industrial Promotion Company (IPC) in order to build a new 
container port – the Saigon Premier Container Terminal – outside Ho Chi Minh City. While 
Abu Dhabi does not yet have major investments or joint ventures with China or South Korea, 
it is nonetheless increasingly involved in other east Asian opportunities which could serve as 
blueprints for future Chinese or South Korean projects. Most notably, in summer 2008 its 
Mubadala Development Corporation acquired the Indonesia-based Pearl Energy hydrocarbon 
exploration and production company. This allowed Mubadala to inherit Pearl’s portfolio of 
concessions and production assets in several east Asian countries, including three oilfields in 
Indonesia, the Jasmine offshore oilfield in the Gulf of Thailand and other resources in 
Vietnam and the Philippines (Mubadala Development Corporation 2009). In 2008 Mubadala 
also took a major stake in a joint venture to develop a large residential and commercial real 
estate opportunity in Malaysia’s Medini Iskander Development City, with the aim of securing 
long term financial and strategic returns for Abu Dhabi. In 2009 this was followed up by 
Mubadala agreeing to invest $1 billion in a new Malaysian fund managed by 1 Malaysia 
Development Berhad (1MDB) that would specialize in investments in energy, real estate  
and tourism projects in Malaysia. 
7. CONSTRUCTION AND LABOUR CONTRACTS 
For some years, construction and labour companies in the Pacific Asian countries have been 
winning contracts in the Persian Gulf, the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) 
having supplied labourers for projects in Kuwait as early as 1983 (Ghafour 2009: 87–9; Yetiv 
and Lu 2007: 203), and a number of other Chinese companies having supplied labourers for 
tourism and real-estate projects in Dubai for about six years. However, very recently a large 
number of major contracts have been awarded to Japanese, Chinese and South Korean 
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companies both to build and supply labour for multi-billion dollar projects in the Persian 
Gulf. Significantly, in many cases these companies have competed successfully against  
Arab and Western companies that have had a much longer history of winning contracts  
in the region and have usually sourced their labour from South Asia. Undoubtedly these  
new contracts serve to solidify further the economic interdependence between the two  
regions while also taking advantage of the Pacific Asian companies’ experience, technologies 
and access to abundant labour. 
Notably, in summer 2006 Japan’s Shimizu Corporation won a high-profile contract  
to construct the Dubai Marina Residences real-estate project on Dubai’s Palm Jumeirah 
manmade island, defeating several regional competitors. In summer 2009 the China Railway 
Construction Company (CRCC) won a similarly fierce contest to be awarded a $500 million 
contract by the Ministry for Education in Saudi Arabia. This will require the Chinese 
company to build over a period of one year 200 schools to accommodate 140,000 pupils. 
Although a total of 3500 schools are now under construction in Saudi Arabia, mostly by Arab 
companies, this Chinese involvement nonetheless represents a significant departure for the 
Saudi authorities (Saudi Gazette, 26 July 2009). Earlier in 2009 China’s Sinopec won a 
similarly lucrative contract in Kuwait, worth $400 million, to build five new oil and gas 
refineries. Alone, these new Chinese-built installations will boost Kuwait’s oil production  
by over 4 million barrels per day by 2020 (Associated Press, 26 June 2009). 
But of the three principal Pacific Asian countries, it has been South Korea that has 
made the greatest inroads into the Persian Gulf’s construction sector. In the UAE, three out  
of five new gas facilities in Abu Dhabi’s Habshan region, to be operated by Abu Dhabi Gas 
Industries (GASCO), will be constructed by South Korean companies. In 2009 Hyundai 
Engineering and Construction, GS Engineering and Hyundai Heavy Industries won their 
contracts, totalling $4.9 billion. Specifically, Hyundai Engineering and Construction’s 
contract is worth $1.7 billion. It will last for four years and will involve building storage  
and wastewater facilities in addition to power facilities. Hyundai Heavy Industries’ contract 
is worth $1 billion and GS Engineering’s contract is worth $2.2 billion, and both will last  
for five years. The latter will build similar facilities alongside Hyundai Engineering and 
Construction, and it will be cooperating with Britain’s Petrofac as part of a joint venture, but 
will hold a 55 per cent majority stake in the consortium. Remarkably, Hyundai Engineering 
and Construction is already believed to be working on nine other projects in the UAE and has 
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recently completed the construction of new gas processing facilities in Saudi Arabia’s 
Khurais field. Elsewhere in Saudi Arabia the company won a $1.9 billion contract in  
late 2008 to build further gas processing facilities in the Karan field, on behalf of Aramco. 
And three other major South Korean companies – Daelim Industrial, SK Engineering and 
Construction, and Samsung Engineering – have won a combined $2.8 billion contract to  
build a new refinery and petrochemicals plant in Saudi Arabia (Korea Herald, 17 July 2009). 
8. DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY 
Surprisingly, for many observers, there is still no obvious security dimension to the 
increasingly interdependent relationship between the Persian Gulf monarchies and  
Pacific Asia. All the former are widely considered to be vulnerable, given their rich  
energy resources, small national populations and close proximity to major conflicts  
and other potential threats. Moreover, their reliance on a Western security umbrella is 
undoubtedly problematic, given the strained relations between the Arab world and the  
United States, not least over the Arab–Israeli conflict, but also following the 2001 invasion  
of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Equally it would seem to make sense for the 
Pacific Asia countries to seek a more active role in the security arrangements and defensive 
shields of their primary energy suppliers.  
Part of the explanation is that the Persian Gulf monarchies do not yet see a reliable 
alternative to the West, as, for all its shortcomings, it was a Western-led alliance that 
liberated Kuwait in 1991 and it is the Western presence that has been credited with 
safeguarding the Gulf from Iraqi or Iranian belligerence in the past. As such, with a few 
exceptions, notably a modest arms trade with China (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2007),14  
almost all the Persian Gulf monarchies’ arms imports have been sourced from Western 
manufacturers. Moreover, although there has been an appreciable increase in China’s naval 
presence in the region – in part due to anti-pirate operations in the Gulf of Aden – there is 
little projection of Pacific Asian military power in the Persian Gulf itself. Instead there 
remain a number of well-entrenched US military bases in Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, a 
British base in Oman and a new French base was even opened in Abu Dhabi in spring 2009. 
Some commentators have argued that the same lack of enthusiasm for a security relationship 
between the two regions applies in reverse: although it is not ideal that the United States 
                                                 
14 Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have, on occasion, purchased Chinese ballistic missiles.  
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dominates the Persian Gulf, the Pacific Asian countries nonetheless see little alternative  
to Western-provided security, given that the thousands of miles of shipping lanes between 
themselves and their hydrocarbon suppliers would be difficult and expensive to protect.  
Thus far, it has remained more practical and cost effective to rely on experienced Western 
navies, which have already invested in a multi-billion capability for this purpose and enjoy 
access to a network of maritime bases in allied states (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 200–1). 
Another component of the explanation is simply lingering distrust, despite all the 
aforementioned economic linkages and converging histories. This is not so much related  
to Japan or South Korea, which are effectively neutral military powers, but rather to China, 
which has repeatedly created difficulties for a stronger security relationship. For many of the 
older generation of Omanis, including their present ruler, Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al-Said, it 
is still difficult to forget that China helped to sponsor the rebellion in Oman’s Dhofar 
province in the 1960s and 1970s, while Britain played a key role in suppressing the rebels 
(Calabrese 1990: 867; Ghafour 2009: 89, 91). In the mid-1980s it appeared that China’s role 
in the region would increase, as Saudi Arabia began to buy Chinese CSS–2 East Wind 
missiles. However, Saudi Arabia was unwilling to go further and purchase Chinese 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, preferring to keep sourcing its ordinance from the United 
States. Most seriously, in 1990 China was unwilling to condemn openly Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait, and following Kuwait’s purchase of nearly $300 million of Chinese howitzers in the 
mid-1990s a Kuwaiti official later claimed that his government had been pressured into the 
deal as China was threatening to withdraw its support for future UN sanctions against Iraq 
(Ghafour 2009: 88–9, 91; Yetiv and Lu 2007: 211). Tellingly, China’s Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs is currently attempting to rewrite this troubled period of history with Kuwait and its 
neighbours by stating that ‘during the Gulf crisis in 1990, China resolutely opposed Iraq’s 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait and demanded that Iraq should withdraw its troops from 
Kuwait and restore and respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Kuwait … both countries share identical or similar views on many major international and 
regional issues, constantly rendering sympathy and support to each other’ (China, Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs 2009). 
Regardless of the various explanations, the present reality is that the Persian Gulf 
monarchies and their great Pacific Asia trade and investment partners do not yet have a 
meaningful security relationship. However, this is in no way jeopardizing their current and 
future closeness, with both clusters of countries now going to considerable lengths to improve 
other, non-economic aspects of their interdependency. Indeed, there now appears to be a tacit 
understanding from both parties that their relationship simply need not contain a military 
security component, at least for the time being. High-level diplomatic visits have, in 
particular, become central to the strategies of both regions. While economic and trade  
matters are certainly discussed at these events, they are nonetheless also perceived as 
valuable opportunities for heads of state and their ministers to meet their counterparts and 
consider a range of other matters. Often substantial gifts or interest-free loans are granted 
during these meetings, clearly in an effort to build more sturdy political and cultural 
understandings, and they  undoubtedly generate further goodwill. In recent years the 
frequency of these visits has greatly intensified, and the seniority of the visitors – especially 
from the Persian Gulf travelling to Pacific Asia – is significantly high, and likely to now  
be higher on average than the seniority of visitors dispatched to Western capitals. 
Given their relatively long history of economic relations it is not surprising that the 
Persian Gulf’s closest political links to Pacific Asia are still with Japan. In the last twenty-
year period there have been twenty Japanese state visits to Saudi Arabia, including the prime 
minister on no fewer than five occasions: in 1990, 1995, 1997, 2003 and 2007. In the other 
direction and over the same period there have been twenty-one Saudi state visits to Japan, 
including Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud in 1998 and the current crown 
prince, Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud, in 2006 – forty-six years after his first visit, 
mentioned above, in 1960. Japan has also dispatched nearly a thousand technical advisors to 
Saudi Arabia over this period – often pro bono – to assist in various Saudi projects. Relations 
between Japan and Kuwait have been similarly strong, six Japanese state visits having been 
made to Kuwait since 2004, including the minister for foreign affairs in 2006, and with five 
Kuwaiti visits to Japan over the same period, including visits from the prime minister, Sheikh 
Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, in 2004, and his successor, Sheikh Nasser Al-
Muhammad Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, in 2008. Moreover, Japan is presently providing in excess 
of $30 million in low-interest loans to Kuwait and nearly $1 billion of technical cooperation 
aid. Although there have been far fewer state visits between Japan and the UAE, the seniority 
of these visits are nonetheless impressive and significant. There have recently been six 
Japanese state visits to the UAE, including the prime minister in 2007 and two former prime 
ministers in 2001 and 2009. In the other direction there have been three UAE visits to Japan, 
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including the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, in  
2007, and the minister for foreign affairs, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, in 2009.  
Over the past twenty years there have been eleven Japanese state visits to Qatar,  
and although most of these were below ministerial level, Japanese prime ministers have 
nonetheless paid two visits, in 1988 and 2007. Over the same period there have been a 
remarkable thirty-six Qatari state visits to Japan, most of which have taken place since Qatar 
began exporting natural gas to Japan. These visits have included three by Qatari rulers – in 
1988, 1999 and 2005 – two by the ruler of Qatar’s wife, Sheikha Moza bint Nassar Al-
Misnad – in 2001 and 2005 – and one by the crown prince, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-
Thani – in 2009. In addition, Japan has provided Qatar with about $25 million in disaster 
relief and about $100 million in technical cooperation aid. Between Japan and Oman there 
have been eleven Japanese state visits to Oman over the same period, including the prime 
minister in 1990 and the vice-president of JBIC in 2004. In the other direction there have 
been fourteen Omani state visits to Japan, including the deputy prime minister, Sayid Fahd 
Mahmoud Al-Said, in 1997 and repeated visits by the sultan’s special advisor, Omar Abdur 
Munin Al-Zawawi, in 2002, 2004 and 2007. To smooth relations further, Japan has provided 
Oman with $1.4 billion in technical cooperation aid and $100 million in other grants. 
Between Japan and Bahrain the picture is again similar, though on a lesser scale. There have 
been sixteen Japanese state visits to Bahrain over the past twenty years, including the 
minister for foreign affairs in 1991 and 2006; while in the other direction there have been 
thirteen Bahraini state visits to Japan, including the crown prince, Sheikh Salman bin Hamad 
Al-Khalifa, in 2008. In recent years Japan has also provided Bahrain with nearly $18 million 
in technical cooperation aid and other grants.  
Although, as described, China was initially much slower to establish broader ties with 
the Persian Gulf monarchies, in recent years, or at least since formal relations began, the 
Chinese relationship with the Persian Gulf has become almost as strong as Japan’s. Notable 
has been the flow of aid between the two regions: with China having much lower per capita 
wealth than Japan, the opportunities for the Persian Gulf monarchies to provide grants, loans 
and gifts to China has been much greater. Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the 
attempted export of Western-style democracy to the Persian Gulf, it has also been claimed 
that the surviving monarchies have become much more comfortable with China, as the latter 
is thought to be less likely to criticize their autocratic political structures, human rights abuses 
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and repression of minorities.15 In summer 2009 China even launched China Central TV in 
Arabic, known as CCTV-Arabic, which has been interpreted as a strong effort from China to 
play a more interventionist role in the Middle East, and most specifically the Persian Gulf, 
where the Chinese government intends to create a better impression of China’s politics and 
culture for its major economic partners (The National, 1 August 2009). 
China’s ties with Saudi Arabia have mushroomed over the past twenty years, China 
having made seventeen state visits, including the minister for foreign affairs in 1990, and 
even, in 1999, the president, who used the occasion to announce a new strategic partnership 
between China and Saudi Arabia (Ghafour 2009: 87–8). In the other direction there have 
been over twenty Saudi state visits to China, including the minister for foreign affairs, Prince 
Saud Al-Faisal Al-Saud, in 1990 and Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud in 
1998. In 1997 Saudi-Sino friendship societies were established in both countries, and in 2006 
Abdullah returned to China to sign several new agreements that would ‘write a new chapter 
of friendly cooperation with China in the twenty-first century’(Ghafour 2009: 87–8). As a 
gesture of goodwill he also agreed to grant China a substantial loan in order to build 
infrastructure in the oil-rich Xingjiang province (Ghafour 2009: 87–8). Notably, this was 
Abdullah’s first international trip as the newly installed king of Saudi Arabia, and the 
president of China declared that the visit would ‘write a new chapter of friendly cooperation 
between the two countries in the new century’ (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 205). Relations between 
China and the UAE are becoming similarly close, with a number of key highlights. There 
have been eighteen Chinese state visits to the UAE over the past twenty years, including 
visits from the minister for foreign affairs and the deputy prime minister in 1989 and 1996. In 
the other direction there have been ten UAE state visits to China, including, most notably, 
that by the ruler of Abu Dhabi and UAE president, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, in 
1990; the ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi, in 1991; and the ruler 
of Dubai and UAE vice-president, Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktum, in 2008. On 
meeting the president of China the latter was told that he was ‘an old friend of the Chinese 
leadership and people … and he had played a major role in enhancing bilateral ties’ (Arabian 
Business, 31 March 2008). Most recently, in summer 2009 Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, 
Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, made a three-day visit to China. During his  
                                                 
15 See, for example, Yetiv and Lu’s discussion of Saudi Arabia’s repression of its Shia minorities and its 
similarities with Chinese repression (Yetiv and Lu 2007: 202). 
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1990 visit Sheikh Zayed made several large donations to China, including grants to establish 
an Arabic and Islamic Studies Centre at Beijing Foreign Studies University and to expand  
the printing factory of the China Islam Association. Sheikh Zayed also took the opportunity 
to grant China permission to set up UAE branches of the Xinhua news agency and the 
People’s Daily newspaper. 
Between China and Kuwait there have been a number of comparable state-level visits, 
with eleven Chinese visits to Kuwait in recent years, including the president in 1989 and the 
minister for foreign affairs in 1990 and 2000. From Kuwait there have been thirteen visits to 
China, including the crown prince, Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, in 1995 and two 
rulers of Kuwait on three separate occasions, in 1990, 1991 and 2009. Sheikh Jabah Al-
Ahmad Al-Sabah’s 1990 visit was made during his period of exile following the Iraqi 
invasion in order to try to strengthen Chinese support (China, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
2009), while Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah’s summer 2009 visit was made in support of 
the aforementioned $9 billion joint venture between the two countries, first set up in 2005. 
During this latter visit Sheikh Sabah stated that ‘these joint ventures and agreements will 
push Kuwait-China relations to an even higher level’ (China, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
2009). Kuwait has also historically been the most generous supplier of low-interest loans to 
China, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development having provided China with over 
$600 million in loans since the mid-1980s, in addition to several large gifts including a 
disaster relief package in 1998 following a period of serious floods in China. 
Like Japan’s, China’s relations with the other Persian Gulf monarchies have been less 
substantial, but again there is strong evidence that the relationship is taken very seriously by 
all parties and is undoubtedly strengthening. Since diplomatic relations began, there have 
been nine Chinese state visits to Qatar, including the minister for foreign affairs in 1990. In 
the other direction there have been thirteen Qatari state visits to China, including the minister 
for foreign affairs in 1993, the ruler of Qatar’s wife, Sheikha Moza bint Nassar Al-Misnad, in 
2001, the prime minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani, also in 2001, and the crown 
prince, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, in 2008. 
There have been 19 Chinese state visits to Oman over the past twenty years, including 
the president in 1989 and the minister for foreign affairs in 1993 and 2009. From Oman there 
have been twenty-three visits to China over the same period, including six separate visits 
from the minister for foreign affairs, most recently Yousef bin Alawi in 2009. Symbolically, 
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in the early 1980s a ‘ship of friendship’ – the Sohar – was sailed from Oman to China, and 
subsequent diplomatic missions have frequently made reference to this. More recently a 
monument to the Sohar was erected in Guangzhou in southern China, and in 2001 Sultan 
Qaboos bin Said Al-Said donated $200,000 to assist the Guangzhou Museum of Overseas 
History build a new Arab and Islamic exhibition room.  
Since China began relations with Bahrain there have been fourteen Chinese state 
visits to Bahrain, including the minister for foreign affairs in 1990, while there have been 
seventeen Bahraini state visits to China, including the minister for foreign affairs in 1990,  
the prime minister, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa, in 2002, and the king’s wife, 
Sheikha Sabika bint Ibrahim Al-Khalifa, later the same year. 
South Korea is on much the same trajectory as its larger neighbours for improving its 
relations with the Persian Gulf monarchies. Although there is less evidence of loans, gifts and 
other donations, this is likely to increase, as already the level of senior diplomatic activity is 
intensifying. Over the past twenty years South Korea has made six state visits to Saudi 
Arabia, including the president on two occasions, most recently in 2007, and the prime 
minister on two occasions, most recently in 2005. In the other direction Saudi Arabia has 
made seven state visits to South Korea, including the crown prince, Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz 
Al-Saud, in 1998. With the UAE there has, if anything, been even more diplomatic activity, 
South Korea having made no fewer than 15 recent state visits, half of them in the last five 
years, undoubtedly in support of the described South Korean construction contracts in the 
country. These visits have included the president in 2006 and the prime minister in 2001, 
2005 and 2006. From the UAE there have been five state level visits over the same period, 
including the vice-president and ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktum, 
in 2007, and the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, in 
2006.There have been twelve South Korean state visits to Kuwait since relations began, 
including the president in 2007 and the prime minister in 2006. In the other direction Kuwait 
has made ten state visits to South Korea, including the minister for foreign affairs in 2002 and 
the prime minister, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, in 2004. South Korea has made seven 
state visits to Qatar in recent years, including the president in 2007 and the prime minister in 
2001 and 2005, while Qatar has made fourteen state visits to South Korea, including the ruler, 
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, in 1999, and the crown prince, Sheikh Tamim bin 
Hamad Al-Thani, in 2009. Over the same period South Korea has made seven state visits to 
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Oman, including the prime minister in 2001 and 2005, while Oman has made nine state  
visits to South Korea, although none have been above ministerial level. Between South Korea 
and Bahrain there have been far fewer such visits, reflecting the lesser extent of economic 
interdependence between the two countries, although in 2007 Bahrain’s minister for  
foreign affairs, Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmad Al-Khalifa, did travel to Seoul on a diplomatic  
and fact-finding mission. 
9. FUTURE INITIATIVES AND COLLABORATIONS 
With the noted exception of military security arrangements, the relationship between the 
Persian Gulf monarchies and the three principal Pacific Asian economies will continue to 
strengthen and broaden for the foreseeable future, provided that the former remain able to 
balance their existing relationships with the Western powers and Pacific Asia, especially 
China (Moran and Russell 2008).16 Thus far, such geopolitical competition would seem to 
have been avoided, given the primary emphasis on bilateral economic linkages, which for the 
most part have had little direct impact on the Persian Gulf’s dealings with the West. Indeed, 
as this paper has demonstrated, the hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon trade between the two 
regions has been rapidly rising in volume and value, and is projected to continue to do so. 
Similarly, it has been shown that the flow of bilateral investments between the two regions 
continues to rise, and a substantial number of construction and labour contracts are being 
signed with ever greater frequency. These trajectories are all being enhanced by improving 
non-economic ties, especially at the diplomatic level, and, as discussed, it is likely that  
these linkages will grow even tighter in the near future. Furthermore, the relationship will 
also be enhanced by several new initiatives and collaborations between the two regions, all  
of which augment existing economic bonds, while some have implications for future  
non-military security arrangements, and others are highly symbolic of this twenty-first-
century partnership. 
In spring 2009 the UAE’s ADNOC began discussions over establishing an Abu Dhabi 
crude oil reserve on Japanese territory in cooperation with Nippon Oil. It is intended that 
ADNOC will begin such storage in late 2009 by using one of Nippon’s existing reserve bases 
in Kagoshima in southern Japan. This agreement will provide the UAE with an alternative 
outlet for its crude oil sales, not only to Japan and its neighbours, but the entire east Asia 
                                                 
16 See Moran and Russell (2008) for a discussion of potential energy rivalries between the United States and 
China. 
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region. Such an outlet would prove vital if the Strait of Hormuz – the entrance to the Persian 
Gulf – was closed in the event of an emergency. From Japan’s perspective the agreement is 
equally beneficial, as it would provide Japan with direct access and a pre-emptive right to 
purchase crude oil in such an emergency. Tellingly, ADNOC’s spokesperson stated that the 
arrangement would ‘contribute to enhancing Abu Dhabi’s relationship with Asian markets 
generally and Japan particularly, and guarantee the flow of crude oil supplies to these markets 
in emergencies’ (The National, 26 June 2009). 
The future energy sector is another likely area of collaboration, with countries from 
both regions actively seeking to set up solar and nuclear joint ventures. In spring 2009 
Japan’s Showa Shell Sekiyu announced that it was considering operating solar power plants 
in Saudi Arabia in cooperation with Aramco, which, as described, is now one of its principal 
shareholders. Showa intends to build small pilot plants in Saudi Arabia by 2010 to test its 
technologies, and should these prove successful then a joint venture with Aramco may be set 
up (Associated Press, 25 June 2009). With the UAE committed to a path of diversifying its 
energy sources and building up a civilian nuclear programme based on imported technologies 
from the United States, its government has repeatedly turned to Japan and South Korea for 
advice and assistance. In early 2009 the UAE signed a nuclear cooperation memorandum of 
understanding with Japan, and in summer 2009 the UAE signed a similar agreement with 
South Korea. A twenty-strong UAE delegation was promptly sent to South Korea – at the 
invitation of the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) – to survey its nuclear facilities, 
especially its safety procedures and mechanisms. Significantly, should the UAE secure the 
US technology, then the contract for the construction of the UAE’s nuclear facilities could be 
awarded to one of two consortia with a major Pacific Asia involvement: one consortium 
includes Japan’s Hitachi, while the other is made up of KEPCO, the Korea Hydro and 
Nuclear Power Corporation and Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company. So 
lucrative could this contract prove to be to South Korea that the South Korean president 
visited the UAE in autumn 2009 in support of the KEPCO bid. 
Perhaps most emblematic of the many new developments that will strengthen the link 
between Pacific Asia and the Persian Gulf in the near future is China’s attempt to reconstruct 
the old Karakoram Highway. This will effectively connect China to the Persian Gulf by a 
land route that follows the same path as the ancient Silk Road. To do so, China will build the 
world’s highest altitude motorway in cooperation with the Pakistani government, which will 
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not only involve a massive investment and working in difficult terrain, but will even require 
the pacifying of local tribes in remote areas beyond the control of the Beijing and Islamabad 
governments (The National, 6 August 2009). On completion, this new highway will connect 
with deep-water ports in Pakistan, most notably the port at Gwadar, in Baluchistan, which has 
direct access to the Gulf of Oman and lies just 250 miles from the entrance to the Persian 
Gulf. China has already invested $200 million in Gwadar, the port having first opened in 
2005 with three berths; China intends it to expand soon to ten berths with a new bulk-cargo 
terminal (Ghafour 2009: 83). 
10. BROADER FINDINGS 
The intensifying connection between the Persian Gulf monarchies and the Pacific Asian 
economies has several wider implications. As has been described, as yet there is little military 
collaboration between the two groups, thereby allowing the United States to continue in its 
role as the protector of the Gulf states and the guarantor of the international oil industry’s 
most strategic shipping lanes. Thus far this has kept to a minimum any tension between the 
United States and China, which is regarded by many observers as the most militaristic of the 
Pacific Asian states. The absence of any significant new hard security arrangements in the 
Persian Gulf has also allayed fears within the oil industry that any superpower struggle for 
mastery over the world’s greatest hydrocarbon reserves is about to take place. However, the 
many other linkages between the Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia, including the various 
economic and diplomatic bonds, and perhaps especially the  new initiatives and 
collaborations described above, will undoubtedly prompt the United States to  
pay more attention to the new relationship. This increased attention, if mishandled  
and too heavy-handed, may in turn reduce trust between the Persian Gulf monarchies  
and their Western allies and partners, thus providing a fresh wave of opportunities  
for Pacific Asian governments and companies to win lucrative contracts and continue  
to increase their influence. 
REFERENCES 
Abu Dhabi Marine Operating Company, 2009. Historical background documents. 
BP, 2008. British Petroleum Statistical Review, June.  
Buxani, R. 2003. Taking the High Road. Dubai: Motivate. 
Calabrese, J., 1990. From Flyswatters to Silkworms: The Evolution of China’s Role in West 
Asia. Asian Survey, 30, pp. 865–73. 
China, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009. Overview files on the GCC states. 
 29
 30
CIA, 2009. The World Factbook, people and economics overviews of Japan, China, South 
Korea, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. 
Davidson, C. M., 2005. The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner. 
Davidson, C. M., 2008. Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Davidson, C. M., 2009. Abu Dhabi: Oil and Beyond. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Evans, R., 1995. Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 
Ghafour, M., 2009. China’s Policy in the Persian Gulf. Middle East Policy, 16 (2), pp. 82–93. 
Gulf Cooperation Council Secretariat, 2009. Economic Relations between GCC Member 
States and the People’s Republic of China. Riyadh: Studies and Research Department. 
Japan, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009. Overview files on the GCC states. 
Moran, D., and J. Russell (eds.), 2008. Energy Security and Global Politics: The 
Militarization of Resource Management. London: Routledge. 
Mubadala Development Corporation, 2009. Press release on Pearl Energy. 
Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2007. China’s Missile Exports and Assistance to the Middle East. 
Monterey: James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies. 
Onley, J., 2007. The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British 
in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Saudi Arabia Market Information Resource and Directory, 2009. Historical background on 
SAMA Foreign Holdings. 
S-Oil, 2009. Historical background documents. 
South Korea, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009. Overview files on the GCC states. 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2009. Overview document on largest funds by assets under 
management. 
UAE, Ministry for Finance and Industry, 2009. Overview file on trade with Japan. 
US Government, Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2009. Qatar profile. 
Yetiv, S. A. and C. Lu, 2007. China, Global Energy, and the Middle East. Middle East 
Journal, 61 (2), pp. 200–14. 
Published Kuwait Programme research papers 
 
Energy and sustainability policies in the GCC 
Steffen Hertog, Durham University and Giacomo Luciani, Gulf Research Center, Geneva 
 
Gender and Participation in the Arab Gulf 
Wanda Krause, Department of Politics & International Studies, SOAS 
 
Nationalism in the Gulf states 
Neil Partrick, American University of Sharjah, UAE  
 
Governing markets in the Gulf states 
Mark Thatcher, Department of Government, LSE 
 
Gulf security: Changing internal and external dynamics  
Kristian Ulrichsen, Kuwait Programme, LSE 
 
The development of Islamic finance in the GCC 
Rodney Wilson, School of Government, Durham University 
 
 
Forthcoming Kuwait Programme research papers 
 
Contemporary sociopolitical issues of the Arab Gulf states 
Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, Emirates University, UAE 
 
Labour immigration, labour markets and demographics in the GCC countries: national 
patterns and trends 
Martin Baldwin-Edwards, Mediterranean Migration Observatory, Panteion University, Athens 
 
Gulf state donorship in conflict-affected and post-conflict environments 
Sultan Barakat and Steven A Zyck, University of York 
 
Arab sovereign wealth funds and the challenge of global governance 
Sven Behrendt, Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut 
 
Migration politics in the Gulf states 
John Chalcraft, Department of Government, LSE 
 
Social stratification in the Gulf and Arab peninsula 
Nora Colton, Drew University, USA 
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the GCC States: From revolution to realpolitik? 
Stephanie Cronin, University of Northampton and Nur Masalha, St. Mary's University College 
 
The Gulf and the financial crisis 
Will Hutton, The Work Foundation 
 
Challenges for resource abundant economies  
Guy Michaels, Department of Economics, LSE 
 
‘Human rights’, ‘Good governance’ and the GCC states 
Gerd Nonneman, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, Exeter University 
 
Diversification and development in GCC countries 
Silvana Tenreyro, Department of Economics, LSE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Christopher M. Davidson is senior lecturer in 
politics at Durham University and a United 
Nations Alliance of Civilizations expert on the 
Gulf states.  He is author of Abu Dhabi: Oil and 
Beyond, Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success, 
and The United Arab Emirates: A Study in 
Survival.  His new book, The Persian Gulf and 
Pacific Asia: From Indifference to 
Interdependence, will be published in 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research paper was written under the 
auspices of the Kuwait Programme on 
Development, Governance and Globalisation 
in the Gulf States at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science with the 
support of the Kuwait Foundation for the 
Advancement of Sciences. 
www.lse.ac.uk/LSEKP/
